d-OAuth-Server/docs/CHANGELOG.md

Changelog

All notable changes to the d-OAuth-Server authorization server are recorded here.

The format follows Keep a Changelog, and the project uses Semantic Versioning. While the version stays below 1.0.0, a minor bump may carry a breaking change.

Unreleased

Added

• Container release publishing on GHCR. A v* git tag builds and pushes the signed multi-arch image under semver tags (X.Y.Z, X.Y, X, latest; a pre-release gets only X.Y.Z) and creates a GitHub Release. The image path is ghcr.io/syavne/d-oauth-server.
• Application-level envelope encryption for the PII directory: emails, client names, contacts, redirect URIs, JAR request URIs, JWKS URLs, software ids, and mTLS subject DNs/thumbprints are sealed with versioned AES-256-GCM under a new mandatory pii_encryption_key, and the looked-up or unique values carry a keyed-HMAC blind index. TOTP secrets move to a per-row envelope (blob version 3) so a DEK can be re-wrapped without re-encrypting the secret. New pii backfill, pii verify, and pii rotate commands run the one-shot migration and PII key rotation, and totp rewrap re-wraps the TOTP DEKs. The expansion adds _enc/_index columns; the backfill blanks the plaintext columns but this release does not drop them (the contract drop is a later release).
• Documentation for the encryption model, the new keys, the expand/dual-write/scale-to-zero-backfill/cutover rollout, and the PII/TOTP rotation runbooks across docs/DATABASE.md, docs/SECURITY.md, docs/CONFIGURATION.md, and docs/OPERATIONS.md.
• GET /logout and POST /logout (a server-specific session endpoint, not an OAuth 2.1 or OIDC feature) end the browser session so a different user can sign in. GET /logout is read-only: it renders a confirm page (live session) or a neutral signed-out page (anonymous) and never destroys the session or writes cookies. Only POST /logout, carrying the session-bound CSRF form_token, destroys the session and expires the cookie, then renders a neutral page or redirects to the flow's registered post_logout URI. It accepts no query parameters: the redirect target is frozen in session meta when the authorization flow is bound and used only while the owning client is active and still registers that exact URI (exact-string match, with the RFC 8252 loopback exception). There is no post_logout_redirect_uri parameter, no id_token_hint, and no end_session_endpoint in metadata.
• The redirect_uris catalog gains a kind column (authorize | post_logout); existing rows backfill to authorize. redirect-uri create|enable|disable|delete and client attach|detach-redirect-uri accept --kind, and config sync file entries accept a kind field. A client may register at most one enabled post_logout URI.
• The server-rendered pages (login, consent, device, TOTP) now share an embedded same-origin stylesheet served at GET /assets/app.css (src/ui/app.css). It adds no JavaScript and needs no CSP change: the page policy's existing style-src 'self' covers it, so script-src 'none' still holds.
• TOTP enrollment now renders the otpauth:// URI as a server-side inline SVG QR code beside the text secret and URI, so users can scan instead of hand-typing. The new qrcode dependency is pinned SVG-only (no image codecs); the text secret, URI, and one-time recovery codes are unchanged.
• A full-database-disclosure response procedure: docs/SECURITY.md gains the dump blast-radius table and the ordered rotation (token pepper, TOTP key, PII field-encryption key, client secrets, DCR registration tokens), and RUNBOOK.md gains the matching operator checklist with concrete commands.
• Cluster hardening in deploy/k8s: the token pepper and TOTP key mount as 0400 tmpfs files under /run/secrets (read through D_OAUTH_TOKEN_PEPPER_FILE / D_OAUTH_TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY_FILE, mirrored in compose.yaml), the image reference defaults to the mutable :latest tag (a digest pin is available but not the default; see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md), a NetworkPolicy default-denies pod egress except DNS plus Postgres/Redis scoped to their namespace (no internet-wide 0.0.0.0/0 peer; scripts/check_manifests.py rejects one), and automountServiceAccountToken is false. Remote JAR request_uri is documented as unsupported under the default-deny, with the Cilium FQDN opt-in path in docs/DEPLOYMENT.md.
• user disable now purges all subject-scoped Redis state for the subject (sessions and their meta, codes, devices with their sidecars and mappings, grants via cascade revoke, standalone tokens, and the lockout counter) before flipping users.disabled; records without a subject (PAR, pending, DPoP and private_key_jwt replay markers, rotation map, TOTP replay, rate-limit counters) are untouched. A Redis failure aborts before the flag changes, so the command fails closed.
• POST /revoke authenticates mTLS-registered clients (RFC 8705 §2) with the verified peer chain injected by the TLS accept loop, exactly as the token and introspection endpoints do; a missing or unregistered chain fails closed as invalid_client. Client certificates are expected to be short-lived, so expiry bounds exposure without a revocation list.
• The token-pepper key ring can retain a previous pepper, matching TOTP and PII: token_pepper_previous_key / token_pepper_previous_key_file with an explicit token_pepper_previous_key_id lets a rotated pepper keep verifying hashes issued under the old one, so rotation no longer invalidates live opaque tokens.

Changed

• The key ring now holds three independent chains (token pepper, TOTP encryption key, and PII field-encryption key), each with an optional retained previous key. pii_dual_write (default false, encrypt-only) turns on dual-write for the rolling-upgrade window; readiness fails closed while the switch is off and any blanked plaintext PII column still holds a value.

• TOTP secrets now use a per-row envelope (blob version 3): a random DEK wrapped by AES-256-GCM under HKDF-SHA256 (info totp-kek-v1), so totp rewrap re-wraps the DEK without re-encrypting the secret. Versions 1 (bare SHA256(totp_key)) and 2 (HKDF info totp-gcm-v2) keep decrypting through a legacy fallback, so no re-enrollment is needed.

• GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server now carries an explicit Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600 instead of relying on browser heuristic freshness, so metadata caching is intentional and tunable. The plaintext health listener (which does not mount the public router's security-header layer) now sets Cache-Control: no-store and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff on its own probe responses, with a regression test pinning both.

• Forwarded client-cert and IP headers are never trusted; the dead proxy-header fallback is removed.

• The login lockout now also covers TOTP enrollment confirmation, and the rate limiter classifies requests by their full path.

• Key ids are String-backed and preserved verbatim end to end: a vN id mixes the 4-byte big-endian generation into the token HMAC message (byte-identical to the pre-change scheme) and any other id mixes its UTF-8 bytes, stored as <kid>.<digest>, so non-vN labels hash distinctly and every trim/parse::<u32> collapse site is gone. Back-compat is scoped to vN ids: hashes issued under an old vN id keep verifying through the retained-key chain (newest-first, capped at 8 generations), so rotation needs no re-issuance.

Security

• A PII or TOTP ciphertext that fails to open (tamper, truncation, or a missing key id) is fail-closed: the request returns 503 temporarily_unavailable and emits a pii.decrypt_failure audit event carrying only the request id, never a value. Full-blob substitution by an attacker with database write access remains out of the threat model and is documented in docs/SECURITY.md.
• Introspection and refresh re-check users.disabled, and refresh re-checks the subject's current entitlements; a disabled subject introspects inactive and refresh rejects with invalid_grant before any token is minted.
• Master keys (the token pepper, TOTP key, PII key, and any retained previous key) shorter than 32 bytes are rejected at load with WeakKeyMaterial.
• private_key_jwt assertion lifetime is capped and its jti replay marker now tracks the remaining validity; PS256 is added to the assertion algorithm allowlist.
• DCR open redirect policy now accepts only https or RFC 8252 loopback URIs, and the SSRF guard pins the fetch to the addresses it pre-validated.
• Secret-holding token types keep a locked Debug: the pepper, TokenService, and minted pairs print ids/lengths plus a [REDACTED] marker, never raw pepper bytes or token strings, and the located-token wrappers stay transitive through identifier-only records. Positive [REDACTED] assertions pin the markers.
• Regression tests pin the hardening headers (no-store, nosniff) on every short-circuit path: limiter 429/503, CORS preflights, body-limit 413, and resilience 503.
• The TOTP replay fingerprint is an HMAC under the token pepper instead of unkeyed SHA-256, so a Redis dump no longer exposes the 6-digit code space.
• JAR request objects are verified against an explicit asymmetric allowlist (RS256/PS256/ES256/EdDSA, kept in sync with the private_key_jwt assertion allowlist); anything else is rejected before key selection.
• Token lookup validates the 43-char base64url shape before HMAC and Redis work, so junk tokens are rejected fast. This is a cost guard only: well-formed lookups still retry retained peppers newest-first.
• POST /logout verifies the session-bound CSRF form_token and rejects a missing or forged token with invalid_request leaving the session intact, so a cross-site POST cannot sign the user out; GET /logout is read-only (confirm page, no Set-Cookie) and the clearing cookie mirrors every attribute of the session cookie.

Fixed

• GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server reads the enabled scope catalog from Postgres on every request. A scope added, enabled, or disabled via the CLI now appears in scopes_supported immediately on every replica, instead of only after a restart; the previous in-process cache was never invalidated by the out-of-process CLI mutation.
• Responses on the OAuth surface are now Cache-Control: no-store (+ Pragma: no-cache) except /.well-known/… metadata, so authorization and consent pages, token bodies, request handles, and errors are never cached by a browser, the back/forward cache, or an intermediary. Token-endpoint error responses now carry no-store, closing a documented gap against draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-16 §3.2.3.
• GET /login?request_id=… rebinds an already-authenticated session to the fresh authorization request instead of redirecting on the session's stale pending binding.
• Permanent Redis infrastructure failures (OOM, READONLY, CROSSSLOT, auth, and connection-type errors) fail closed as 503 temporarily_unavailable instead of 500, while programming-error classes stay masked as server_error so 500-alerts still fire on real bugs.
• Dead audit-misleading code is removed: the client_assertion JOSE stub (the real logic lives in protocol::client_auth::assertion) and the caller-less store::grants::add_token helper.
• Auditor-facing comments corrected: the jose module TODO no longer lists the deleted stub, the token shape-gate comment no longer claims to mask generation probing, and the two algorithm allowlists carry keep-in-sync pointers.
• Device decide runs a single conditional-HSET Lua script instead of EXISTS-then-HSET, so a concurrent consume cannot leave a zombie record; the device poll marker is a Lua compare-and-set admitting exactly one poller (the rest get slow_down).
• PAR/code consume binds the ownership check into the consume Lua (consume_bound over client_id, plus redirect_uri/PKCE challenge for codes): a foreign-client or wrong-verifier presentation leaves the single-use record intact instead of burning the victim's value.
• The token endpoint accepts a missing or empty redirect_uri on grant_type=authorization_code and skips the binding check (draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-16 §4.1.3, §10.2); a supplied value must still match exactly or redemption fails invalid_grant.
• A private-use redirect-URI scheme must contain reverse-DNS dot notation (draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-16 §2.3.1): com.example.app:/ is accepted and myapp:/ is rejected with invalid_redirect_uri on DCR and invalid input on the CLI; https and the RFC 8252 loopback exception are unchanged.
• Refresh rotation splits the scope (draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-16 §4.3.1 + §4.3.3): the replacement refresh token retains the presented scope re-checked against the current enabled catalog, client registration, and user entitlements (revoked entries drop silently), while an explicit narrower scope narrows only the access token and the response scope.
• Grant cascade revoke drains in a bounded loop until the member set reads empty, and the rotation script carries a grant-record fence (NOGRANT before any write), so a token minted mid-cascade is deleted by a later pass or refused outright.
• A durability-barrier failure after the originating write returns the minted pair (RotatedUnbarriered on rotation) or deletes the won DPoP marker so the originating jti can re-claim, instead of locking the client out; other callers stay fail-closed (a Replay hit discards its orphan pre-mint and rejects with invalid_grant).

0.1.0 - 2026-10-03

The first release. This is an OAuth 2.1-only authorization server, not a backwards-compatible OAuth 2.0 server. The deltas are deliberate: see OAUTH.md for the exact differences.

Added

• Authorization-code grant with mandatory PKCE S256; plain and missing challenges are rejected. Implicit and resource-owner-password grants do not exist.
• Refresh-token grant with rotation, tombstones, and reuse detection. Rotation is idempotent under a deterministic rotation_request_id, so a retried request returns the same tokens instead of double-rotating.
• client_credentials, device-code (RFC 8628, with the user-facing /device page), and policy-gated token-exchange (RFC 8693) grants.
• Opaque access and refresh tokens: 256 bits of CSPRNG output, base64url encoded, stored only as a keyed HMAC-SHA256 hash under a versioned pepper. No raw token ever reaches Postgres, Redis, a log, or an error body.
• Dynamic client registration (RFC 7591) and management (RFC 7592), protected by a one-time initial-access token; open registration is off by default. Registration access tokens are hashed in Postgres so client management survives a Redis loss.
• Sender-constrained tokens: DPoP (RFC 9449) and mTLS (RFC 8705), plus PAR (RFC 9126) and JAR (RFC 9101). private_key_jwt is client authentication only and is never treated as a sender constraint.
• Introspection (RFC 7662) and revocation (RFC 7009), including grant-chain cascade revocation.
• RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata with scopes_supported served from the enabled scopes table. The document carries no jwks_uri: the server signs no artifact of its own.
• Resource-owner login with Argon2id, TOTP (RFC 6238, plus recovery codes and a used-code replay cache), server-side Redis sessions, and server-rendered login/consent pages with CSP and CSRF protection.
• Runtime-managed scope catalog and redirect-URI catalog. Scope reduction is enforced as requested ∩ client-registered ∩ user-entitled ∩ enabled.
• Operator CLI for every administrative action: migrate, serve, user, scope, redirect-uri, client, config sync, config check, admin bootstrap, initial-access-token issue, keygen, and healthcheck. There is no HTTP admin API and no default credential.
• Admin bootstrap that creates exactly one admin under an advisory lock in a single transaction, with a forced password change and TOTP enrollment before the account gains authority.
• Fail-closed dependency handling: a Postgres or Redis outage returns 503 temporarily_unavailable with Retry-After on security paths, never a fail-open success and never a 500 or panic.
• A minimal multi-arch container image (static musl, non-root UID 65532, no shell) and a healthcheck subcommand that probes the plaintext health listener without a shell or curl.
• Redis topologies from day one: single node, Sentinel (with hand-built master re-resolution), and Cluster (with native slot refresh). Multi-key atomic operations stay on one hash slot through the {state} hash tag.

Security

• #![forbid(unsafe_code)] across the crate; unwrap, expect, and panic are denied by lint in request paths.
• Opaque hash-at-rest token storage with a versioned key ring for the token pepper and the TOTP encryption key.
• Rate limiting per IP and per client, with counters in a keyspace separated from token state so counters can never evict tokens.
• Security headers: CSP with frame-ancestors 'none', X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, and HSTS on the TLS listener.
• No wildcard CORS. Browser public clients require an explicit origin allowlist.